Guy Lamb, Programme Head: Arms Management, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

Recently, the future of the United Nations (UN) process designed to coordinate global action against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons was decided by a vote. This development was unexpected and unprecedented, as it ran contrary to the culture of consensus decision-making that has consistently characterised small arms and light weapons dealings within the UN environment. The vote was entirely due to the obstinacy of Iran, and has consequently resulted in the Iran’s further diplomatic isolation.

In 2001 UN Member States adopted a document titled: Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects. This Programme of Action (PoA) includes recommendations on a range of arms control issues, including support to countries afflicted by gun violence. Member States met in 2003, 2005, 2006, and in mid-July this year to review progress in the implementation of the PoA, as well as chart the way forward. The 2006 meeting gained notoriety as it failed to achieve a consensus position for the future of the PoA. The July 2008 meeting, which is officially referred to as the Third Annual Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) to Consider the Implementation of the PoA, was widely touted as the event that would resuscitate the UN small arms and light weapons process.

 The BMS was held from 14 to 18 July 2008 in the smoky recesses of the basement of the UN Headquarters in New York. Conference Chairperson Mr Dalius Cekuolis (Lithuania) and his team had undertaken considerable consultations and preparations in the build-up to the BMS. A narrowly-focused, largely uncontroversial agenda had been devised, which only included small arms / light weapons stockpile management; international cooperation, assistance and capacity-building; marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons and illicit arms brokering. Despite this, the United States opted to boycott the meeting, with the exception of the discussions relating to the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons.

 As per usual, consensus was used as the basis for decision-making on the content of the conference outcome document, which would provide PoA implementation direction. For the first three days constructive discussions between conference delegates took place on a draft outcome document that had been compiled by the chairperson. However, from day four, what had initially started as grumblings from the Iranian delegation about the decision-making process, amplified into fully-fledged objections. Iran insisted that the consensus approach should be replaced with line-by-line negotiation on the chairperson’s draft outcome document. In response, the chairperson indicated there was insufficient time for a line-by-line negotiated process to be pursued.

 By lunchtime on the final day of the BMS, Iran’s position had become entrenched. Behind-the-scenes negotiations, pleas, criticism and compromise suggestions from a large number of Member States (including by some of Iran’s staunch allies) were unsuccessful in shifting the Iranian delegation. At the eleventh hour the Iranian delegation called for a recorded vote on the chairperson’s outcome document (as amended by consensus). BMS delegates agreed to the vote. However, as Member States were about to press their voting buttons, Iran indicated that it would abstain from voting, and stated that in future international arms control processes it would push for the voting principle to be used. This statement resulted in comments of condemnation from many Member States, including China.

 Despite these statements, the vote took place. One hundred and thirty-four UN Member States voted in favour of the outcome document, while only Iran and Zimbabwe abstained. Zimbabwe’s reason for abstaining is unclear as it had been silent throughout most of the five days of the BMS and had not verbally supported Iran during the deliberations.

 Despite this diplomatic drama, the BMS outcome document provides constructive recommendations for the future implementation of the PoA, particularly in the areas of stockpile management, marking and tracing and illicit brokering.