Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

As the Republic of Sudan gradually comes to terms with the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for President Omar al-Bashir early last month, the people of Southern Sudan are approaching the much awaited 2011 referendum on self determination.

Coincidentally, the arrest warrant comes at a time when Sudan is preparing for national elections, seen by most southerners as one of the first major tests in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA ended the two-decade north-south civil war in Sudan. These national elections, which were to take place by July 2009 and were to mark the end of the transitional period that began in July 2005, have however now been postponed to February 2010.

The CPA in fact requires that elections take place at the latest in or before July 2009, concurrently at six levels: the presidencies of the Government of National Unity (GNU); the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS); the National Assembly; the South Sudan Legislative Assembly and the governorships and state legislatures in all the country’s states. To the southerners, these elections will mark the first test towards a tenable 2011 referendum.

While every southerner wishes that the arrest warrant does not scuttle the realization of the CPA, several Southern-based issues continue to pose a threat to its full implementation. Primary among these is the question of civilian disarmament. The call to disarm civilians is contained in section 14.6.5.15 of the CPA under the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Implementation Modalities during the pre-interim and interim period (31 December 2004). The section empowers the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMT) to monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed. To most Southern Sudanese civilians the security of their families and property (primarily cattle) lies with the ability of the household to withstand attacks from adversarial neighbours from other states, as well as from cross-border regions, who aim to raid their cattle. Similarly, once raided, the communities require weapons to restock their cattle.

The trade in arms, especially AK-47 rifles, therefore remains one of the most lucrative businesses in Southern Sudan. Historically though, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) issued most of the weapons in circulation to civilians during the civil war against the north. Now that the war is over, the civilians have found a new purpose for the weapons, based on the fact that GoSS is yet to guarantee its subjects the much-needed security.

Based on the spirit of the CPA, the GoSS has previously implemented disarmament across the country, sometimes with disastrous consequences. For instance, in May 2006, a major confrontation occurred in the Jongolei State triangle of Motot, Karam, and Yuai between SPLA soldiers and armed civilians belonging to a local militia group named the White Army. The SPLA attempted to disarm the White Army coercively. During the altercation, over one hundred White Army fighters were killed, forcing SPLA to suspend the operation.

A similar situation occurred in September 2008 when SPLA officers from other parts of Southern Sudan were deployed in Rumbek Central County to undertake forceful disarmament. The disarmament was launched without prior warning to the residents, catching many unawares. The SPLA reportedly cordoned off Rumbek town and conducted a house-to-house search. Angered by the process, civilians retaliated by engaging the soldiers in a shoot out in which several people were killed and many others wounded. The gravity of the situation led the Governor of Lakes State and the SPLA secretariat to call off the disarmament operation and suspend indefinitely the presence of SPLA in Rumbek Central County.

Equally alarming is the fact that of the over three thousand weapons collected in the Jongolei operation, all but a handful were accounted for after storage, as the bulk of them were effectively smuggled out and sold back to the community by the SPLA soldiers assigned to guard the weapons. This partly confirms the assertion that the main source of arms and ammunition supply to Southern Sudanese are government forces, most of whom go for months without salaries. SPLA deserters as well as SPLA officers who voluntarily demobilise but retain their weapons awaiting the commencement of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process also have the tendency to sell their weapons to civilians, thereby exacerbating the circulation of weapons amongst communities. In some instances, SPLA officers have their siblings residing in cattle camps, taking care of family cattle. Soldiers then undertake to supply arms, ammunition and food to their kin residing in the cattle camps.

Although many lessons can be learnt from the approach so far undertaken in disarming the Southern Sudanese community, it is discernible from the experience gathered that coercive disarmament is not the best approach. Voluntary disarmament may be most suitable under these circumstances, as long as a comprehensive assessment of the communities’ opinion and recommendations are first collected and analysed, and awareness campaigns conducted to sensitize people on the gains (such as development projects) that come with an arms-free society. Only when the society starts appreciating the approach can the people agree to lay down arms. In the case of Southern Sudan, however, a combination of mechanisms may be necessary. For instance, the fact that several uncertainties lie ahead on the road to the 2011 referendum, it is may be important to ascertain whether the reluctance of the communities to disarm could be partly linked to the fear that the CPA may not hold until the referendum, hence the need for a wait-and-see attitude.

Of prime importance is the need for the South Sudanese to quickly realise that while the CPA is a cornerstone of the country’s peace and stability, this dream will only be realised when arms in civilian possession are effectively controlled by the government and fratricide conflicts halted. Similarly, for lasting peace to take root, the GoSS has to put in place effective legislation governing possession and ownership of firearms - not only amongst civilians, but also within the rank and file of uniformed personnel. A crucial aspect of such legislation would be the need to define what an illegal firearm is in the context of the legislation. The CPA does not provide any guidelines on this.